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EMINENT DOMAIN AND OIL PIPELINES: A SLIPPERY
PATH FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
Natalie Jensen*
INTRODUCTION
Oil pipelines are controversial. The Keystone XL Pipeline, poised to
be the largest oil pipeline in North America, has generated opposition
from tens of thousands, including those who marched on the White
House and even His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who urged President
Obama to focus on renewable energy solutions instead.1 Civil rights
came under attack when the Dakota Access Pipeline, which is planned
to run from North Dakota through South Dakota and Iowa to Illinois,
demolished sacred Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sites.2 Protests of the
Dakota Access Pipeline became front-page news as law enforcement
turned tear gas and water hoses on the crowds standing in solidarity
with the Native Americans affected by the pipeline’s construction.3
However, another source of controversy for oil pipelines that is
becoming increasingly contentious is private oil companies’ use of
eminent domain to acquire land on which the pipelines will be built.
Oddly enough, this controversy crosses political lines and creates
unusual bedfellows. For example, those who are in favor of
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1. Ryan Harrigan, Transcanada’s Keystone XL Pipeline: Politics,
Environmental Harm, & Eminent Domain Abuse, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 207,
208 (2012).
2. Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in The Dakota Access Pipeline Fight, NAT.
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/
514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight
[http://perma.cc/U5N4-A6UC].
3. Id.
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strengthening domestic energy production from traditional carbonbased sources often strongly oppose eminent domain as an overstep of
governmental power.4 On the other end of the spectrum, those who
generally support the use of eminent domain to redevelop blighted
areas often do not want to expand domestic fuel production, choosing
instead to focus on renewable energy sources.5
Oil pipeline siting is not federally regulated unless the pipeline is
sited on land under federal jurisdiction.6 Therefore, state law governs
oil pipeline siting.7 However, state laws conflict in their treatment of
oil pipelines. To build oil pipelines, oil companies must receive
easements from private landowners to build on their land. Depending
on the state, oil companies may be subject to permitting and
environmental review by state agencies in order to begin construction
of the pipeline.8 Some landowners refuse to accept the oil pipeline
company’s compensation for their land and refuse to grant the pipeline
company an easement for the pipeline. In most states, the oil company
may then use eminent domain to take the land, circumventing the
landowner’s property rights.9 In such circumstances, landowners have
sued, declaring an unconstitutional taking by a private company. This
area of the law is largely unsettled due to a lack of consistency from
state to state. Therefore, if a company intends to build an oil pipeline,
like the Keystone XL Pipeline or the Dakota Access Pipeline, and
landowners object, the company will be subject to the eminent domain
laws of each state and municipality along the intended route. Overall,
this suggests that the current landscape is untenable.

4. Phil McKenna, Anti-Eminent Domain but Pro-Pipelines: A Republican
Conundrum, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/29022016/eminent-domain-oil-pipelines-keystone-xl-republican-donaldtrump-ted-cruz [http://perma.cc/CZ9V-WTPW].
5. Id.
6. Student Corner: Regulating Energy – Oil, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/students/regulation/oil.asp (“FERC does not regulate the
oversight of oil pipeline construction. The authority rests with states and local
jurisdictions.”).
7. Id.
8. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines:
The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L.
J. 409, 423 (2016).
9. Id.
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Many environmentalists oppose the use of eminent domain for the
siting, or plan for construction and development of routes, for oil and
natural gas pipelines, as these forms of energy are nonrenewable and
therefore arguably not in the public’s best interest.10 However, eminent
domain may be the answer to promoting a transition to renewable
energy sources, such as wind power, solar power, and hydropower.11
Renewable resources such as solar power and wind power are usually
built far away from population centers both because these resources
are more abundant and because there is more land on which to site the
generating source.12 This is problematic, as the supply of electricity
must be delivered to the population centers with high energy demand
by a high-voltage transmission system, “which has become
increasingly stressed in recent years as growing demand has
outstripped capacity.”13 As with oil pipelines, states have various
regulating entities that focus on environmental aspects or economic
aspects of a proposed transmission line or base permitting on voltages,
length of the proposed transmission line, or benefit to the
community.14 A one-regulation-fits-all approach does not seem ideal
10. Nives Dolsak et al., The Big Fight Over the Dakota Access Pipeline,
Explained, WASH POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/20/this-is-why-environmentalists-are-targeting-energypipelines-like-the-north-dakota-project/?utm_term=.c007fd7d9dd7
[http://perma.cc/XD4X-XZTU].
11. Herman Trabish, How New Transmission can Unlock 10 Times More
Renewables for the Eastern U.S., AM. FOR A CLEAN ENERGY GRID (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://cleanenergygrid.org/how-new-transmission-can-unlock-10-times-morerenewables-for-the-eastern-u-s/ [http://perma.cc/9HA3-UDPW].
12. See Brad Plumer, These Maps Show the Best Places to Put Solar and Wind
Power. (It’s Not Where You Think.), WASH. POST (July 15, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/15/these-maps-showthe-best-places-to-put-solar-and-wind-power-its-not-where-youthink/?utm_term=.ec6f4537a113 [http://perma.cc/TTJ5-D4H2].
13. THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., What You Need to Know About
Energy (last visited Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/12204/#slide3. This
stress may cause disruptions in power services, as seen during the blackout in 2003
that affected 50 million people from Ohio to New York to Canada. Id.
14. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 40-360.06 -360.07(B) (Arizona statute requiring aboveground transmission lines with a capacity of 115,000 volts or more to meet numerous
factors similar to those for a power plant construction); Florida Transmission Line
Siting Act, §§403.52-5365, F.S., and Rule 62-17, F.A.C. (Florida law requiring
transmission lines 230 kV or larger, cross a county line, or are greater than 15 miles

2017]

EMINENT DOMAIN AND OIL PIPELINES

323

at first glance because both clean and dirty energy are regulated
differently, which is understandable given the differences in the source
of energy,15 safety concerns,16 and uses of energy.17 But, a centralized
regulatory framework could advance a modern and innovative energy
policy that advocates for renewable energy while considering the
transition from nonrenewable sources.
This Note attempts to address the patchwork of state pipeline
regulation and proceeds in three parts. First, Section I describes why
private companies are allowed to use eminent domain. This section
tracks how private companies acting in specific contexts are
considered “public uses.” Such contexts include when companies act
as common carriers, public utilities like electric transmission lines or
natural gas pipelines, and private companies involved in economic
developments. Next, Section II explains the conflicting state eminent
domain laws that treat oil pipelines differently to either grant or deny
the oil companies the right to build their pipelines. Finally, Section III
proposes a “cooperative federalism” model that would allow state
autonomy under a federal regulatory framework. In such an
arrangement, states could elect to treat oil companies as private
companies and deny them the right of eminent domain or adhere to the
baseline national standards for eminent domain, which would include
a clear showing of “public use” or necessity before the pipeline
in length to receive approval by the Department of Environmental Protection, state
and local governments, and a final decision by the Governor and Cabinet sitting at
the Siting Board). Edison Electric Institute, State Generation & Transmission Siting
Directory: Agencies, Contacts, and Regulations 5, 26-28 (Oct. 2013)
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/State_Generation_Tra
nsmission_Siting_Directory.pdf.
15. See
Energy
Sources,
ENERGY.GOV,
https://energy.gov/scienceinnovation/energy-sources (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). Water, photovoltaic rays, oil,
and wind (all sources of energy) have different physical qualities and are regulated
differently at the federal and state level. Compare What FERC Does, FERC (May
24, 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp with What FERC Does Not Do,
FERC (May 24, 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp.
16. See Elisa Wood, The Dangers of Energy Generation, RENEWABLE ENERGY
WORLD (May 25, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/print/
volume-14/issue-3/solar-energy/the-dangers-of-energy-generation.html
[http://perma.cc/XC4H-62NK].
17. See generally THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., What You Need to
Know About Energy (last visited Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nap.edu/
read/12204/#slide1.
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company could use eminent domain. Ultimately, this model would
create a framework that is inclusive of both state preferences and the
renewable energy sector.
I.

EMINENT DOMAIN

The Fifth Amendment gives the government the right to take private
land for a public use with just compensation to the landowner,
commonly referred to as the power of eminent domain.18 According to
scholars, no legislative history exists to indicate the drafters’
interpretation of “public use” in the Fifth Amendment.19 Although no
“public use” provision exists in English laws either, historically, the
government’s exercise of eminent domain was uncontested for public
highways or mills that had wide-spread benefits.20 However, with the
industrial expansion of the nineteenth century, landowners began
seeking legal remedy for what they believed to be unconstitutional
takings for uses such as government buildings or railroad expansion.21
The Supreme Court was forced to decide whether “public use” would
narrowly apply only to land actually used by the public, or whether it
would apply broadly to land that was for a more general public
purpose.22 The Court decided on a broad view of “public use” that
encompasses a public purpose generally, but the Court also granted
deference to the states to decide the more tailored purposes for their
constituents.23
The federal government has “power to appropriate lands or other
property within the States for its own uses, and to enable it to perform
its proper functions.”24 The power of eminent domain has enabled the
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the definition of “just compensation” has been
an area of contention, this Note focuses on the definition of “public use.”
19. See William Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 553, 591-95 (1972); MICHAEL WOLF ALLEN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
79F.03 (2017).
20. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1905); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton
Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916) (citing Clark,
198 U.S. at 367-68).
24. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (holding the government had
the right to take land for the construction of a customs building and post office).
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government to provide transportation routes, water supply, national
parks, naval bases, and large infrastructure projects to citizens as those
public needs arose.25 This implied power is conferred onto states
through the Fourteenth Amendment and through state constitutions
that also condition government takings on the premise of a “public
use” and on payment of just compensation to the landowner.26 Over
time, the legal confines of eminent domain that once theoretically
protected landowners from unconstitutional takings have been
broadened as the definition of what qualifies as a “public use” has
expanded. The definition of “public use” has evolved to include uses
that arguably only benefit private actors, but within a broad scope
could possibly affect the public. The definition of “public use” is
important in determining whether an oil pipeline should qualify as a
public use, as a broad definition may allow or exclude private oil
companies.
This section examines how the Court’s definition of “public use”
intertwines with private entities seeking to use eminent domain. When
analyzing the private benefit from governmental power of eminent
domain, it is important to look at the legal history surrounding three
areas where private entities have the power of eminent domain. First,
common carriers’ use of eminent domain is explained, showing how
private actors were given the right of eminent domain for large
infrastructure transportation projects, and how federal regulations
shaped the landscape of common carriers’ operation. Next, the
relationship between electric utilities’ use of eminent domain and state
and local government is explained. While utility companies are
regulated differently based upon the type of energy transmitted,
virtually all traditional types of energy have the power of eminent
domain, either through federal or state governments. Lastly, the
general “public use” doctrine is explained, showing the development
25. See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, DEPT. OF JUST. ENVT. &
NAT. RESOURCES DIV. https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminentdomain; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884) (holding the
government had the right to acquire property from landowner, with just
compensation, to provide drinking water to a city via aqueducts); Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893) (holding Congress had the right to acquire
property from landowners, with just compensation, for the designation of land as a
national park).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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of economic uses that allow the government to transfer land from one
private landowner to another.
A. Eminent Domain for Common Carriers
Railroad companies have the power of eminent domain in their
capacity as common carriers.27 Rooted in common law, the rights,
privileges, duties, and liabilities of common carriers differ with those
of private carriers, also called contract carriers.28 A common carrier
“must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for hire as a business. . . .”29 Furthermore, designation as a
common carrier depends “not . . . upon whether its charter declares it
to be such, . . . but upon what it does.”30 Factors that determine a
common carrier designation include: regular service, unpredictable
and changeable customers, business solicited from the general public,
and the carrier’s responsibilities defined by regulations.31 Factors that
determine a private carrier include: occasional service, identifiable and
stable clientele, targeted business solicitation, and responsibilities
defined by contract.32 One of the most important duties railroads have
as common carriers is a duty to provide nondiscriminatory service.33
The railroad industry was the first federally-regulated private
industry. Seeking to take a stand against monopolies, in 1887 Congress
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”).34 The ICA established
the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”), which set reasonable
rates for the railroad industry.35 At that time, most states allowed
27. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 24311 (2014) (“Amtrak may acquire by eminent
domain . . . interests in property necessary for intercity rail passenger
transportation.”).
28. Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common
Carriage, The Columbia Insititute for Tele-Information, Telecommunications Policy
(1994).
29. Fish v. Chapman & Ross, 2 Ga. 349 (1847).
30. United States v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 249 U.S. 296, 304 (1919).
31. Noam, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Kevin M. Sheys, Strategies to Facilitate Acquisition and Use of Railroad
Right of Way by Transit Providers. Transit Cooperative Research Program, TRANSP.
RESEARCH BOARD, LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST, 3 (Sept. 1994).
34. Interstate
Commerce
Act,
OUR
DOCUMENTS,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=49.
35. Id.
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railroad companies the same power of eminent domain given to state
governments, but some states limited railroads’ use of eminent domain
by requiring landowner consent in certain circumstances.36 Most aid
for building the railroad infrastructure in the United States came from
private investors, but the government did provide assistance through
land grants,37 loans, and states’ transfer of eminent domain power.38
The ICA was reversed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), which transferred regulatory
power of railroad siting and construction to the Surface Transportation
Board (“STB”).39 The ICCTA preempts state and local laws that
manage or govern rail transportation,40 specifically, the “construction,
acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of rail
tracks.”41 Accordingly, siting of railroads, including eminent domain
proceedings, are regulated by the STB and not the state.42
Under the ICA railroads and oil pipelines shared a distinction as
common carriers after passage of the 1906 “Hepburn Amendment.”43
Oil pipeline regulation was based on railroad regulation, even though
36. See Larry W. Thomas, Railroad Legal Issues and Resources, TRANSP.
RESEARCH BOARD, LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST 2 at 435 (2015); see also Hairston v.
Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 608 (1908) (holding railroad’s condemnation
of property for conducting railroad business lawful); Buck v. District Court for
Kiowa County, 199 Colo. 344, 348, 608 P.2d 350, 351-52 (1980) (holding railroad’s
condemnation of property adjoining railroad lawful); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 §
6005 (2014) (granting eminent domain to railroads but prohibiting takings of
dwellings, meetinghouses, or burial grounds without consent).
37. See Landmark Legislation: Pacific Railway Act of 1862, U.S. SENATE
HISTORICAL
OFFICE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
generic/PacificRailwayActof1862.htm.
38. Clarence Carson, Throttling the Railroads 2: Aiding the Railroads: 1830 –
1871 FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (June 1, 1970),
https://fee.org/articles/throttling-the-railroads-2-aiding-the-railroads-1830-1871/.
39. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-16106 (2014).
40. The Federal Laws Applicable to Railroads, THE ALBEMARLE COUNTY LAND
USE LAW HANDBOOK, Ch. 33 (March 2012), (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of
Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 157-58 (4th Cir. 2010)).
41. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2014).
42. See Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding a Vermont environmental land use statute that could deny a railroad’s
construction was preempted by ICCTA).
43. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines:
The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L.
J. 409, 410 (2016).

328

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

they served vastly different purposes.44 In The Pipe Line Cases, the
Court made a distinction between oil pipelines as common carriers and
private carriers by defining private carriers as pipelines “serving the
sole purpose of moving the owner’s oil from its own wells to its own
refinery, even if the movement crossed state boundaries.”45 However,
the purpose of the ICA’s designation of oil pipelines as common
carriers was to regulate oil rates, not to determine other liabilities and
rights as a common carrier, such as the right of eminent domain.46 In a
case determining the ICC’s right to request information from a
pipeline, Justice Jackson stated that while the pipeline would be
subject the ICC’s request, the oil pipeline was “not a common carrier
in the sense of the common law carrier for hire.”47 In interpreting the
legislative history of the ICA the Supreme Court reasoned,
[t]here is little doubt, from the legislative history, that the
Act was passed to eliminate the competitive advantage
which existing or future integrated companies might possess
from exclusive ownership of a pipe line. This evil could not
have been reached by bringing within the coverage of the
Act only those pipe lines who were common carriers for hire
in the common-law sense. . . . Hence the bill as finally
enacted was clearly intended “to bring within its scope pipe
lines that although not technically common carriers yet were
carrying all oil offered, if only the offerers would sell at their
price.48

44. Id. at 411.
45. 70 FERC P61,035 at 61,111(quoting The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548

(1914)).
46. 21 FERC P61,260 (1982). “[The ICC] fashioned a special system for oil
pipelines. That system differed materially from and was far more indulgent to the
regulatees than the agency’s railroad and motor-carrier methodologies. The salient
feature of the ICC’s oil pipeline jurisprudence was its permissiveness.” Id. at 61583.
47. Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29, 33 (1946) (holding that
the ICC can order oil pipeline company to provide rates, treating the oil pipeline as
a common carrier without deciding on the common carrier status.)
48. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297-98 (quoting The
Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 560 (1914)).

2017]

EMINENT DOMAIN AND OIL PIPELINES

329

This analysis of why the ICA coined all oil pipelines common
carriers shows that the ICA’s designation of oil pipelines as common
carriers should not have any bearing on whether an oil pipeline is a
common carrier for purposes of eminent domain.
While oil pipeline rate regulation is now handled by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), there has been a shift to
opening contract carriage, or private carriage, to new pipelines and
limiting the common carrier obligations, as pipelines are often
essentially used by a single company.49 These long-term private
contracts bypass the notion of a common carrier for hire, which is the
original reason some states allow siting of oil pipelines, and the reason
some states allow oil pipelines the power of eminent domain as a
“public use.”50
B. Eminent Domain for Electric Utility Companies
Like common carriers, electric utility companies have the power of
eminent domain as they provide an essential public use. In the early
1900s, many municipalities vied for the ownership of utility
companies to provide lower rates to their constituents. However, in the
1920s just sixteen private companies controlled more than 75% of
power generation in the United States.51 The structure of energy
transmission was mostly regional, with transmission lines often
crossing state lines.52 This led the Supreme Court to hold that states’
regulation of interstate electricity sales violated the Commerce
Clause.53 Soon after, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act (“FPA”)
49. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines:
The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L.
J. 409, 425-26 (2016).
50. Id. at 426. See also Oxy Midstream Strategic Development, LLC 141 FERC
P61,005 at P8 (2012), Kinder Morgan Pony Express Pipeline LLC, 141 FERC
P61,249 at P10 (2012).
51. Alexandra Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach
to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1914 (2015).
52. Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in
Electricity, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, 4 (2011), http://www.asce.org/
uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Our_Initiatives/Infrastructure/
Content_Pieces/failure-to-act-electricity-report.pdf.
53. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89
(1927).
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to grant authority to the federal government54 to regulate interstate
energy rates.55 Nevertheless, States retain power over the siting of
transmission lines – including interstate transmission lines – that
consists of the power to grant electric utility companies a designation
as a “public use” for eminent domain authority.56
One exception to the state-regulated siting of electric utilities is for
natural gas pipelines. As with electrical transmission lines, the industry
operated largely unregulated and unchecked so multiple states
attempted to exert jurisdiction over interstate natural gas pipelines.57
The natural gas industry eventually fell under Federal Trade
Commission’s (“FTC”) scrutiny because of the potential to
monopolize on a public utility.58 Around the same time, the Supreme
Court thwarted state attempts at self-regulation, again holding that
interstate rate regulation by the states violated the Commerce Clause.59
Under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) enacted in 1938, FERC was
tasked with the regulation of natural gas as a utility and not as a
common carrier. The Act passed even though natural gas pipeline
companies lobbied against it.60 The NGA gives eminent domain power
to natural gas pipelines that receive a certificate of public convenience
from FERC.61 States may intervene in the certification process through
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) reviews. The
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) often delegates NEPA
review to the relevant state environmental authorities. Because natural
54. When enacted in 1935, the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) created the Federal
Power Commission (“FPC”), which later became the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”). Klass, supra note 51, at 1914.
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-825r (2014), “Federal Power Act.”
56. Klass, supra note 51, at 1916.
57. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead
to Burnertip, 25 ENERGY L. J. 57, 61 (2004).
58. Id.
59. See Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307
(1924) (holding that transportation of natural gas from one state to another is
interstate commerce and therefore not local to either state); see also Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 597 (1923) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a
state producing natural gas to prefer consumers in its state than consumers in another
state).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (2014); see also Alexandra B. Klass & Daniella
Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 947, 995 (2015).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2014).
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gas pipelines must comply with NEPA before receiving a certificate of
public convenience, the NEPA process affords states an opportunity to
participate.62
C. Public Use Doctrine as Applied to Public-Private Takings
A different, more controversial, jurisprudence exists for
government-sanctioned projects that transfer property from one
private party to another private party when neither party is a common
carrier or utility company. The government cannot take property from
one private landowner and transfer it to another private party without
a public purpose.63 However, governments have granted land to private
entities for the economic redevelopment of blighted areas and other
large infrastructure projects that benefit the public in a tangential way,
even though such projects directly benefit the private entity that
ultimately gains control of the land.64
The landmark 2005 decision, Kelo v. City of New London, marked
the Supreme Court’s determination that “public use” should be defined
broadly. Yet, the decision was not a complete change in judicial
interpretation.65 As early as 1954, the Supreme Court signaled a broad
understanding of the term “public use” in Berman v. Parker.66 In
Berman, the Court held that Congress’ decision to redevelop a blighted
area in Washington, D.C. constituted a public use.67 Illustrating that
eminent domain was merely a means to an end, the Court defined the
“concept of public welfare [as] broad and inclusive.”68 In 1984,
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff again signaled the Court’s
broadening interpretation of public use when the Court sanctioned the
use of eminent domain to give land from the monopolizing landowners
to renters, essentially transferring the land from one private landowner
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b-1, 717f(c) (2014).
63. U.S. CONST. amend V. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477

(2005).
64. See, e.g., N.R. Kleinfeld, Opponents of Atlantic Yards are Exhausted by a
Long, Losing Battle, N.Y. Times (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/26/nyregion/exhausted-from-an-angry-and-losing-battle-against-barclayscenter.html.
65. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
66. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 33.
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to another.69 In a majority opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, the Court expanded the limits of “public use,” writing “it is
not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order
for it to constitute a public use.”70 These cases adopted a rational basis
standard of review, meaning the court defers to the legislative
determination “until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”71
State courts followed the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of
“public use,” deferring to state legislative determinations. For
example, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the
Michigan Supreme Court held a sufficient “public use” existed for
General Motors to construct a new manufacturing facility in place of a
neighborhood because of the economic benefits it would bring to the
community.72 Scholars concluded that in deferring to the government
and finding a “public use” in most circumstances, courts were
“effectively imposing no check on the use of the eminent domain
power.”73 In 2004, the Michigan Supreme court overturned the 1981
Poletown decision that permitted General Motors to use eminent
domain, instead announcing that granting a private company eminent
domain power violated the state constitution.74
The protection awarded to Michigan landowners against takings by
a private company gave hope to other concerned landowners, as the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kelo later that same year.
However, when the Supreme Court announced the Kelo decision in
2005, it did not extend the same protections to landowners as the
Michigan Supreme Court did in 2004. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court allowed the taking of private land for an economic development
project, which was ultimately sold to other private entities.75 The Court
69. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
70. Id. at 244, (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707

(1923)).
71. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240, (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269
U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
72. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
73. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 495 (2006).
74. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
75. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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leaned heavily on its earlier decisions in Berman and Midkiff,
announcing again that deference should be given to government
determinations of “public use.”76 In this case, the “public use” was an
increase in tax revenue and job creation through the development of a
generally blighted area.77 The majority held the “public use” did not
have to be literal, that public purpose was to be understood broadly.78
The holding of the case does not mean that every possible taking by a
private party can be justified. Indeed, the Court stated some private
transfers may “risk . . . undetected impermissible favoritism of private
parties” where a presumption of invalidity could be warranted.79
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Conner warned, “all private
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded – i.e., given to another
owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public – in the process.”80 Justice O’Connor wrote
that the decision stands in contrast to Court’s prior holdings that “a
purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use
requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and
would thus be void.”81 She concluded that the majority’s decision has
“delete[d] the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”82
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, many state legislatures
altered the definition of “public use” to limit the scope of constitutional
takings, thereby protecting landowners in their state from takings by
private parties.83 In contrast, some states have used economic
development as a “public use” to virtually create new cities out of
blighted areas, using eminent domain to fashion new urban

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 480-82.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 493 (Kennedy J., concurring).
Id. at 494.
Id. at 500 (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245
(1984)).
82. Id. at 494.
83. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2120 (2009); see, e.g., Ala. Const. § 23 (prohibiting
eminent domain for purposes of generating tax revenue or for “forced subscription”
to corporations).
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accomplishments.84 Because eminent domain for oil pipelines is
regulated on a state-by-state basis, an individual state’s legislation that
restricts the scope of “public use” would apply rather than the broad
federal definition. While some states limited the scope of “public use”
through legislation, many state legislatures either did not address the
definition of “public use” or did not contemplate whether oil pipeline
siting could qualify as an exception, and as Section III addresses a
proposed federal regulation for siting oil pipelines, the federal
definition of “public use” could determine the power, or lack thereof,
of oil pipelines to use eminent domain in those states.85
II. CONFLICT OF EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER STATE LAWS
As private entities, oil companies’ use of eminent domain is not
regulated by federal statute. To obtain land to build oil pipelines,
companies must either contract privately with landowners or receive
designation as a common carrier or energy utility by a state, enabling
them to use eminent domain. States differ in their approach to granting
oil pipelines the power of eminent domain. Some states heavily
regulate the siting process, some allow oil companies nearly unlimited
access to land, and others refuse to allow oil companies the use of
eminent domain to build pipelines. Because the federal government
only regulates the rates of oil transported by pipeline and not the siting
process, state-specific laws conflict. This causes uncertainty for
landowners seeking a remedy to the threat of an oil company taking
their land.
This Section describes the legal structure at the state level
surrounding the use of eminent domain for siting oil pipelines. This
Section first discusses states that regulate oil pipelines as common
carriers. Next, this Section turns to states that regulate oil pipelines as
public utilities. Finally, this Section considers states that either do not
allow oil pipelines to use eminent domain or have created a hybrid
structure for regulating oil pipelines.

84. See, e.g., DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS BY THE CITY OF NEW YORK
PURSUANT TO EDPL SECTION 204 WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PROPERTY TO BE
ACQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NO. 7 SUBWAY EXTENSION – HUDSON YARDS
REZONING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
85. See infra, § III.C.
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A. States Granting Eminent Domain to Oil Pipelines as a Common
Carrier
Texas is most well-known for its connection to the oil business and
its laws are relatively broad to facilitate its booming oil industry. Prior
to 2012, pipeline companies were able to appropriate land through
eminent domain by receiving a Railroad Commission permit and filing
a tariff setting rates, proving the company was a common carrier.86 In
2011, the state amended the Texas Property Code to further protect
property owners from unconstitutional takings.87 The condemning
party must have first made a “bona fide offer” to the landowners that
gave a 30-day period for the landowner to accept, followed by a final
written offer that includes the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and the
appraisal report to support the compensation offered.88 The 2012 Texas
Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC
became a landmark decision for Texas wherein the Texas Supreme
Court held that more was required of pipeline companies to prove
common carrier status as a matter of law.89 This decision responded to
the Railroad Commission’s “rubber stamp” policy, which approved all
oil pipelines in Texas without a thorough review to ensure that they fit
within the state’s definition of a common carrier.90
In Nebraska, landowners protested the TransCanada Keystone XL
Oil Pipeline’s use of eminent domain through their state and sued,
alleging a state law allowing eminent domain for “major oil pipelines”
was unconstitutional.91 This law, L.B. 1161, allowed the Keystone XL
pipeline to use eminent domain upon approval by the Governor, an
approval usually made by the Public Service Commission, which has
jurisdiction over common carriers. According to Nebraska common
law, a common carrier’s offering of services to the general public is
“not always relevant to determining whether it is a common carrier.”92
86. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 381
S.W.3d 465, 465-67 (Tex. 2012) (addressing the common-carrier status of oil
pipelines while resolving a question of carbon dioxide pipelines).
87. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.0113 (2011).
88. Id.
89. Id. See Thomas J. Forestier, Jamie Lavergne Bryan, & Larence M. “Trey”
Lansford III, Feature: What’s in the Pipeline?, 79 TEX. B.J. 218, 219 (2016).
90. See Forestier et al., supra note 89.
91. Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 (2015).
92. Id. at 835.
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The court held that per the definition of common carrier in Nebraska,
“an oil pipeline carrier is a common carrier if it holds itself out as
willing to transport oil products for a consideration to all oil producers
in the area where it offers its transportation services.”93 The majority
wrote that “[u]nder the Nebraska Constitution’s limitation on the
power of eminent domain, pipeline carriers can take private property
only for a public use.”94 They warned that under L.B. 1161, the
Governor could potentially approve a project that was instead for
private use, which would be unconstitutional.95
Although the court found L.B. 1161 unconstitutional because it
allowed the Governor to approve the pipeline route, the law was not
struck down. Nebraska’s constitution requires a supermajority vote for
constitutional challenges to a statute, and because only four judges
signed onto the majority opinion, the requirement was not met.96 The
majority also found that the Governor’s approval of the Keystone XL
Pipeline was unconstitutional, but the future of Keystone XL in
Nebraska remains unclear.97 The court’s holding exposes the problems
inherent in regulating oil pipelines as a common carrier: the pipeline
company may receive the eminent domain power of a common carrier
while in reality providing no public use.
B. States Granting Eminent Domain to Oil Pipelines as a Utility
In Iowa, oil pipelines are granted the right of eminent domain to
“promote the public convenience and necessity” under Iowa Code
Section 479B.9.98 Iowa was one of the last states to rule on the Dakota
Access Pipeline’s route, when landowners challenged Dakota Access,
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id. at 847-48. See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. Four judges signed onto the
majority opinion, one judge did not participate, and three judges dissented in part
and concurred in the result.
97. See Mitch Smith, Risen from the Grave, Keystone XL Pipeline Again Divides
Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017). Because the Keystone XL Pipeline required
a Presidential Permit and was denied under the Obama administration, TransCanada
had to re-submit for approval by the Nebraska PSC when President Trump granted
a Presidential Permit for the same pipeline. Id.
98. IOWA CODE § 479B.9 (2017); Lamb v. Iowa Utilities Board, No.
CVCV051997 *17 (Iowa District Court for Polk County 2017)
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LLC’s (“Dakota”) authority to use eminent domain. Landowners
brought multiple claims alleging that: (1) there was no public
necessity, (2) economic impact should not be a factor in deciding the
proposed pipeline, and (3) Dakota showed no “service to public” in
Iowa.99 Because the Dakota Access Pipeline was sited to run through
Iowa with no “on ramp” or “off ramp,” the landowners argued that
Iowa should not grant Dakota the power of eminent domain, as the
public would not be granted any use.100 The court did not agree and
deferred to the Iowa Utilities Board, which stated the economic and
safety benefits of the pipeline outweighed the cost to the
landowners.101
Michigan also regulates pipelines as public utilities, allowing oil
pipelines “the right to condemn property by eminent domain . . . to
transport crude oil or petroleum [or] to locate, lay, construct, maintain,
and operate pipelines.”102 The Michigan Public Service Commission
approves construction of new pipelines, and Michigan courts
recognize that oil pipelines are a public utility, qualifying as a public
use.103 In Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that an oil pipeline was a public use, whether or not the oil
company constructing the pipeline conducted its business in
Michigan.104 The Court found that “the private benefit, if such there is,
is merely incidental to the main purpose.”105
C. States Denying Eminent Domain to Oil Pipelines
Colorado does not grant the power of eminent domain to oil
pipelines. In a landowner suit against Sinclair Oil Company, the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that a Colorado statute that conveys
99. Lamb v. Iowa Utilities Board at *17-18.
100. Id. An “on-ramp” or “off-ramp” is a section of the pipeline that would receive

oil from or distribute oil to the state.
101. Steve Davies, Iowa Farmers to Appeal After Losing Dakota Access Pipeline
Challenge, AGRIPULSE (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8946iowa-farmers-to-appeal-after-losing-dakota-access-pipeline-challenge. The Iowa
Utilities Board found that approximately 25 long term jobs would result from the
Dakota Access Pipeline, directly or indirectly. Id. at 20.
102. 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 16 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 438.2(1) (2014)).
103. See Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1954).
104. Id. at 911.
105. Id.
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the authority of eminent domain to any “pipeline company,” did not
apply to oil pipelines.106 The court found that other sections granting
the power of eminent domain for pipeline maintenance specifically
referred to pipeline used for “the transmission of power, water, air or
gas.”107 Therefore, the court reasoned that the General Assembly
“intended to authorize eminent domain power for the construction of
electric power infrastructure.” Because the legislature did not
“expressly or by clear implication” grant oil pipelines the power of
eminent domain, oil pipelines did not possess that power.108
In Georgia, the Department of Transportation Commissioner denied
a request for a certificate of public necessity from Kinder Morgan, an
oil pipeline company proposing a $1 billion oil pipeline through
Georgia and South Carolina.109 Kinder Morgan challenged the
decision, but the Commissioner’s decision was upheld in state court.110
The court held that the Commissioner’s finding that “the proposed
pipeline would not serve a public convenience and a public necessity”
was supported by a downward trend in fuel consumption and the
possibility for a decrease in competition in the area.111 The Georgia
General Assembly then passed a bill preventing pipeline companies
from exercising eminent domain until 2017, allowing the General
Assembly time to consider recommendations from a study.112
Representative Don Parsons authored House Bill 413, which is a
compromise between environmentally conscious or property
protective landowners and oil pipelines. The Bill creates a two-step
process for surveying and acquiring land through eminent domain
proceedings.113 First, oil companies apply for a certificate of need from

106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-5-105 (2013); Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co., 284
P.3d 42, 45 (Co. 2012).
107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-4-102 (2013).
108. Larson v. Sinclair Transportation Co., 284 P.3d 42, 45 (Co. 2012).
109. Keith Goldberg, Kinder Morgan Halts $1B Ga. Pipeline Amid Land Grab
Ban, LAW 360 (Mar. 31, 2016).
110. Palmetto Products Pipe Line LLC v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., Civil Action File
No. 2015CV262194 (Super Ct. of Fulton Cty. State of Ga. 2016).
111. Id. at *6.
112. O.C.G.A. § 22-3-85 (2016).
113. 2017 Ga. Laws 263.
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the Georgia Department of Transportation.114 Second, Georgia’s
Environmental Protection Division must grant a permit for the oil
pipeline.115 This compromise allows Georgia to deny a pipeline the
right of eminent domain from two perspectives: economic and
environmental. First, the economic or public necessity of an additional
pipeline can be dispelled through a showing of declining oil usage.
Alternatively, the environmental harm can be shown by the potential
for oil spills to pollute water, natural resources, and wildlife.
In South Carolina, the state legislature passed a similar bill to
Georgia’s General Assembly bill, placing a three-year moratorium on
“for-profit pipeline companies” exercising eminent domain power.116
South Carolina historically conferred the same duties and
responsibilities of telegraph and telephone companies onto pipeline
companies.117 Prior to the enactment of the bill, South Carolina
Attorney General Alan Wilson’s office issued an opinion stating his
“substantial doubt” that the legislature intended to extend to private
petroleum or oil companies the power of eminent domain.118 The bill
excludes oil pipelines from “public utility” companies, distinguishing
oil pipelines from natural gas pipelines and water pipelines.119
While both bills were only temporary stays on the oil companies’
power of eminent domain, the combined actions of the Georgia and
South Carolina legislatures led Kinder Morgan to halt its planned
project completely.120 Even now that Georgia’s compromise bill has
passed,121 opening the conversation to state legislatures proved a
useful tool for protecting Georgia’s preferences. Indeed, it was enough
to stop Kinder Morgan, which explained that the project was halted

114. Mary Landers, Georgia Lawmakers Pass Compromise Pipeline Bill,
SAVANNAH NOW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://savannahnow.com/news/2017-0331/georgia-lawmakers-pass-compromise-pipeline-bill.
115. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-2-2 (2016).
116. 2016 Act No. 205, § 2; see Brent Owen, Ga. and SC are Newest
Battlegrounds for Eminent Domain, LAW 360 (October 13, 2016).
117. S.C. CODE §58-7-10 (2016).
118. See 2016 Act No. 205, pmbl.
119. Id.
120. Owen, supra note 116.
121. Landers, supra note 114.
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due to “unfavorable action by the Georgia Legislature regarding
eminent domain authority and permitting restrictions.”122
III. A SOLUTION TO OIL PIPELINE SITING REGULATION
The conflicting laws surrounding oil pipeline companies’ use of
eminent domain are inefficient. Landowners, environmentalists, state
and local regulators, and even oil pipeline companies struggle to
understand with any certainty whether a pipeline siting will be
approved or denied and whether private land will be taken through
eminent domain. While some states approve nearly every pipeline
siting,123 other states regulate heavily, which can deter pipelines from
siting in that state.124 Environmentalists opposing new pipelines may
support existing state-by-state regulation because in heavily-regulated
states, oil pipeline companies are less eager to develop new pipelines.
There are, however, two major drawbacks. First, in states with hardly
any checks on oil companies’ power, private land is subject to taking
by eminent domain and the potential for environmental harm is
increased. Second, the patchwork of conflicting state laws
disincentives the use eminent domain for more justified public uses
such as renewable energy sources. This is so because states with strict
regulations on eminent domain block both oil pipeline companies and
renewable energy companies.125
This Section first explains why the federal government should
regulate oil pipeline companies’ use of eminent domain. Next, this
Section explores why the “pubic use” doctrine should be limited as
applied to oil pipeline. Specifically, this Section argues that oil
pipelines should be regulated differently than common carriers or
public utilities. Moreover, although oil pipeline companies could
122. Robert Walton, Kinder Morgan halts Palmetto Pipeline project over Georgia
proposed
pipeline
moratorium,
UTILITY DIVE
(Apr.
1,
2016),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/kinder-morgan-halts-palmetto-pipeline-projectover-georgia-proposed-pipelin/416682 [http://perma.cc/J53N-R7D7].
123. Jeff Mosier, Latest Ruling on Eminent Domain Eases Fears of Texas Pipeline
Builders, DALLAS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/
energy/2017/01/11/latest-ruling-eminent-domain-eases-fears-texas-pipelinebuilders [http://perma.cc/BKG7-56KQ].
124. Landers, supra note 114.
125. See Alexandra Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional
Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1914 (2015).
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arguably qualify as a “public use” under Kelo, this Section suggests
that this judicial solution is inadequate because it does not address
important underlying issues such as possible environmental
degradation, property rights, and the need for a shift to renewable
energy. Finally, this Section proposes an alternative option for federal
oil pipeline regulation: new legislation that gives a federal agency
authority to regulate oil pipeline siting under a two-step permitting
process. This cooperative federalism solution would mandate statelevel environmental permits and a clear showing of public need at the
federal level prior to an oil companies’ use of eminent domain.
Ultimately, such a process would allow states to deny an oil pipeline
siting if warranted while retaining the ability to grant eminent domain
to those energy projects found to produce real public benefit. At the
very least, this solution would allow a baseline of environmental
protection, and the clear showing of public necessity would best
balance the needs of the nation, of the states, and of individual
landowners.
A. A Federal, Rather than State, Solution under the Commerce
Clause
Because states regularly deal with land use issues,126 the federal
government has largely left siting to the states. However, “energy
policy relies heavily on the coordination of state and local
governments.”127 Because state and local governments are completely
uncoordinated in the oil pipeline siting process, neither landowners nor
oil companies can adequately prepare or anticipate consistency. In
considering the Commerce Clause in connection with the Supremacy
Clause, the issue of pipeline siting lends itself to federal regulation.
Major pipelines often cross state boundaries, making them similar to
railroads, which are federally regulated, or to natural gas, which is also
federally regulated.128 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[w]here the
126. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (“Regulation
of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”).
127. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause
Review for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 130 (2015).
128. David A. Domina, Pipelines and Energy Corridors: Valuation Perspectives
– Holding Private Condemnors to the Line, SX015 ALI-ABA 129, 18 (2016); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3, “Commerce Clause” (giving Congress the power
to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
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[State] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”129 With oil pipeline companies’ use of eminent domain, state
statutes do not regulate evenly. Laws along any given pipeline may
conflict with the regulation of siting. Furthermore, the effects on
interstate commerce are not merely incidental.130 As such, federal
intervention is warranted.
There is a push from scholars to transition to a more regional
approach for the United States energy grid. A regional approach would
be more efficient and would also help facilitate a transition to
renewable energy, which requires regional infrastructure to send
energy from renewable resources to city centers.131 Such a transition
could only be completed under a federal structure that facilitates
cooperation between state governments and other competing interests.
Federal regulation of oil pipeline siting would not only address the
regional nature of oil pipeline infrastructure and routes, but also enable
consideration of the national and regional economic benefits, rather
than consideration of solely localized benefits. A broader focus on
national and regional benefits could also open the door to increased
renewable energy infrastructure.
B. Under Federal Regulation, Oil Companies’ Power of Eminent
Domain under the “Public Use” Doctrine Should Be Limited
While state statutes give oil companies authority to use eminent
domain to site oil pipelines, no federal agency is equipped to grant this
same authority. Multiple federal agencies regulate pipelines for a
variety reasons. For example, the Department of Transportation
the Indian tribes.”); and U.S. CONST. art. VI, “Supremacy Clause” (giving federal
law superiority over state law in areas where the federal government legislates or
regulates.).
129. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
130. See, e.g., State Lines are Danger Zones for Gas Prices, Gasbuddy Finds, GAS
BUDDY (July 27, 2017), https://business.gasbuddy.com/blog-overpaying-across-usborders/ (noting towns bordering state lines experienced price spreads as high as
$1.70 per gallon).
131. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional
Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1985 (2015).
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regulates pipeline safety through the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) and FERC regulates the
transportation of oil.132 Yet, neither of these agencies currently has the
capacity or authority to regulate pipeline siting. Only through new
legislation will consistent, predictable, and protective regulation of oil
pipelines be accomplished.
1. Oil Pipelines Are Not Common Carriers
The nature of oil pipelines is very different from railroads. Although
in both cases the common carrier designations is used as a mechanism
of rate regulation to destroy monopolies, this designation should not
necessarily also transfer eminent domain power.133 As common
carriers, railroads transport people and goods and must provide service
upon reasonable request.134 Oil pipelines, on the other hand, are
cyclical in nature, with large integrated oil companies operating by
“simply transferring money from one pocket to another.”135 In the
Williams Pipe Line Company adjudication, FERC analyzed the
structure of oil companies with regard to pipeline usage, making
observations that directly oppose oil pipelines’ designation as a
common carrier. FERC found that “when it comes to transportation,
the large integrated oil companies are their own best customers.”
While this analysis is not binding, it highlights that as self-serving
businesses, oil companies should not receive designation as common
carriers to declare a public use for eminent domain purposes.
Numerous investigations into large oil companies have shown no
monopolization or anti-trust violations.136 Yet, the public service
provided by railroads starkly contrasts with the stable clientele of
contracted pipeline users and operators, namely the oil companies
themselves, which fits squarely within the definition of private

132. See PHMSA, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/; FERC,
https://www.ferc.gov/.
133. See supra Section I.A.
134. 49 U.S.C. § 11101 (2015).
135. Williams Pipe Line Company, 21 FERC ¶61,260 at 61,570 (1982).
136. Timothy J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyed, 100 Years of Standard Oil Antitrust
Symposium: Article: The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum, and
Politics at the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843 (2012).
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carriers.137 Because oil pipelines do not provide a public service, they
should not be classified as common carriers.
2. Oil Pipelines Are Not Public Utilities
Oil is undoubtedly a source of energy that many Americans,
especially those who own or drive a car, depend upon. However, this
does not entitle oil pipelines the same public utility designation as
electric utilities or even natural gas pipelines. Gasoline is the main
petroleum product consumed in the United States, and gasoline prices
are not regulated by the federal government.138 While gasoline is
heavily used by the United States, it is sold on the free market to
consumers.139 In contrast, natural gas is more similar to electricity than
oil in function, providing energy directly to homes and businesses.
Natural gas is classified as a public utility at the state level as well as
the federal level,140 as “natural gas has long been the dominant choice
for primary heating fuel in the residential sector.”141 Because oil is
more similar to a commodity and not a utility, it should not be
designated as a public utility.

137. Noam, supra note 20.
138. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines:

The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L.
J. 409 (2016).
139. See Barry Nielsen, Why You Can’t Influence Gas Prices, INVESTOPEDIA
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/gas-price-emails.asp
[http://perma.cc/9AKA-8MF3]. In 2016, about 143.37 billion gallons (or about 3.41
billion barrels) of finished motor gasoline were consumed in the United States, a
daily average of about 391.73 million gallons (or about 9.33 million barrels per day).
This was the largest amount of annual motor gasoline consumption on record.
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/
faqs/faq.php?id=23&t=10.
140. See, e.g., Energy and Natural Gas, PUB. UTILITY COMM’N,
http://www.puc.state.or.us/Pages/electric_gas/index.aspx; Natural Gas Industry,
MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/natural-gas-industry.
141. Everywhere but Northeast, Fewer Homes Choose Natural Gas as Heating
Fuel, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=18131.
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3. Oil Pipelines Are Arguably a “Public Use”
In her dissent in Kelo, Justice O’Connor feared that distinguishing
private from public takings would be impossible.142 Because the
decision in Kelo neither required a literal definition of “public use” for
a legitimate eminent domain purpose nor an actual “public benefit”
other than economic revitalization, an oil pipeline regulated at the
federal level would easily fit under this wide umbrella of “public uses”
if such a question was litigated. However, litigation would not
necessarily address important factors such as possible alternatives,
weighing the costs and benefits, or determining if the community
would actually benefit from a pipeline. Because no federal agency has
the authority to regulate oil pipeline siting, this issue could only come
about if legislation established that authority within an agency.
C. Proposed Legislation
Legislation transferring all regulatory authority of oil pipelines –
from the siting process to the eventual decommissioning – to a federal
agency would provide consistency and reliability. A two-part approval
process would ensure baseline environmental protections, while also
giving protection to landowners. First, the legislation transferring
power to a federal agency would require a clear showing of public use
before issuing eminent domain authority. This would give property
owners more security, as all decisions could be appealed to the
overseeing regulatory authority.143 While this would, in theory, be less
protective than state laws that do not currently give eminent domain
authority to oil pipeline companies, the legislation’s second prong

142. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005).
143. See Ilsa Somin, The Growing Battle Over the Use of Eminent Domain to Take

Property
for
Pipelines,
THE
WASH.
POST
(June
7,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/07/thegrowing-battle-over-the-use-of-eminent-domain-to-take-property-forpipelines/?utm_term=.f47fd3576bb1 [http://perma.cc/6BFW-UZAT]. While public
opinion may call for a clear showing of public use to provide security in land
ownership, a similar process for natural gas pipeline siting through FERC arguably
does not provide such security. See Joe Mahoney, Lawsuit Claims FERC is Just
Rubber Stamp for Pipelines, CATSKILL MOUNTAINKEEPER (Mar. 7, 2016). Through
the natural gas siting process, pipelines must receive a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, which has never been denied by FERC since 1986. Id.
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would allow for states to deny a pipeline siting on environmental and
safety grounds.
Second, the legislation would impose an environmental permit for
pipeline siting before allowing the oil company to acquire land through
eminent domain. This permitting process could be delegated to each
state’s environmental protection agency as a form of “cooperative
federalism.” The cooperative federalism model is a collaboration
between the federal agency and state agency that has been very
successful in regulating polluters under the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act.144 Permitting at the state level would insulate states from
federal agency “rubber stamping,” as state reviews and regulations
could be more protective than the baseline federal standards in the
proposed legislation. The purpose of these environmental permits
would be to prevent adverse impacts to state or federal land, water, or
air quality. These permits would also provide more targeted
regulations as compared to state or federal environmental assessments,
which are not currently required for pipeline siting in most states.145
Further, the environmental permitting process would act as an
additional safety measure, as environmental aspects of pipeline safety
currently occur only as reactive measures, for example, when a
pipeline oil spill threatens surrounding rivers or lakes. While some
states already implement state environmental assessments, the
requirement for an environmental permit would provide a baseline
level of protection for states that do not implement environmental
reviews for oil pipeline siting.
Through such a cooperative federalism model where federal, state,
and local governments work together and regulate equally rather than
separately,146 states would have a voice in the impact of oil pipeline
144. See Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the
Clean Power Plan has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 301 (2017).
“Congress intended for cooperative federalism to be at the heart of the CWA.”
Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Meghan Bolan, Postcards From the Edge: Perspectives
to Reinvigorate Clean Water Act Cooperative Federalism, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY
& ENVTL. L. 68, 81 (2013).
145. See, e.g., Mary Landers, Georgia Lawmakers Pass Compromise Pipeline Bill,
SAVANNAH NOW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://savannahnow.com/news/2017-03-31/
georgia-lawmakers-pass-compromise-pipeline-bill [http://perma.cc/H7CA-64S2].
146. See Cooperative Federalism, Legal Definitions (last visited Nov. 27, 2017),
https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/cooperative-federalism/.
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siting projects. Furthermore, such a model could easily be transferred
to renewable energy sources, such as intrastate transmission lines that
bring solar power and wind power to cities, improving the U.S. energy
infrastructure. Indeed, some scholars note that “green infrastructure,”
which encompasses renewable energy transmission lines, would be
impossible without cooperative federalism.147 Under this model state
agencies could be more protective than the federal baseline for
nonrenewable energy project citing, yet under the same structure states
could streamline the process for siting if a renewable energy
transmission line benefited the state’s constituents or economy. This
second step of the approval process would also give states an important
check against the federal government for circumstances where the
federal plan would harm a state resource or disadvantage the state in
some other way. Overall, the environmental permit process enables
greater discussion of land use and energy alternatives. Indeed, the
proposed legislation would also allow for public comment at both
stages of the permitting process. The steps could occur simultaneously,
as the oil pipeline would not gain the power of eminent domain until
after it receives both permits, similar to the siting process in states such
as in Iowa.148
Finally, states could also employ a Cost-Benefit Analysis (“CBA”)
of the public use and environmental impact of oil pipeline siting and/or
transmission line siting projects. A CBA would weigh the costs of a
project, including the use of eminent domain, environmental impacts,
and the potential negative economic effects, against the benefits of a
project, including economic stimulation of renewable energy
development, creation of jobs, tax base increase, and less reliance on
nonrenewable energy sources that contribute to climate change. CBAs
give states the opportunity to directly compare giving an oil pipeline
the power of eminent domain and giving a renewable energy
transmission line the power of eminent domain. Incorporating CBA
into this two-step permitting process may make states more willing to
147. See
Roger Feldman, Cooperative Federalism (Apr. 2009),
http://www.retailenergy.com/feldman/0904flmn.htm; see also ABA, Cooperative
Federalism and Green Infrastructure Development Program Overview, ABA
SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES (March 31, 2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/environ/programs/
teleconference/0809/CooperativeFederalism/Final_Flyer.authcheckdam.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Iowa, supra Part III.B.a.
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grant the power of eminent domain to clean energy projects – where
the benefits likely outweigh the costs149 – as opposed to rejecting the
use of eminent domain entirely, even in circumstances where it would
be desirable. Under the proposed permitting process states can better
tailor their grants of eminent domain power those projects that will
actually advance national, regional, and local public purposes.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over oil pipelines extends beyond their potentially
harmful environmental impacts and includes the large and contested
area of law concerning oil companies’ use of eminent domain to
construct pipelines. While pipeline siting is left to the states to regulate,
many states have conflicting laws that create uncertainty for both
landowners and oil companies. Some states grant oil companies the
power of eminent domain by regulating oil pipelines as public utilities,
others regulate oil pipelines as common carriers, and some do not grant
oil companies the power of eminent domain. Even though oil
companies are private businesses, their use of eminent domain relies
upon a government finding that oil pipelines qualify as a “public use.”
Because the “public use” doctrine is not limited in its application, there
is a strong likelihood that an interstate oil pipeline would arguably
have a “public use” under the expansive definition. Therefore, the most
environmentally protective path forward includes federal regulation
that utilizes state environmental permits in addition to federal siting
permits, offering states a way to deny oil pipeline siting without losing
the possibility of using eminent domain for those energy projects that
actually do advance a public purpose. As technology changes the
perception of energy, the legal framework surrounding energy
development will also change. One day, pipelines may be obsolete and
replaced with new alternative fuels and transportation methods; still, a
federal regulatory structure would help pave the way forward for
renewable energy transmission and siting, and give landowners
consistency and notice, while offering environmental protection
measures.

149. Union of Concerned Scientists, Benefits of Renewable Energy Use (Dec. 20,
2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/public-benefits-ofrenewable-power#.Wp1uJZPwau4 [http://perma.cc/T2AR-YP8J].

